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1. Introduction
Caution is warranted when inferring that a highly autocorrelated variable can predict asset
returns. One reason is the possibility of a “spurious” regressor: If the unobserved expected
return on an asset is time-varying and persistent, another persistent variable having no true
relation with return can appear to predict return in a finite sample. Ferson, Sarkissian,
and Simin (2003) demonstrate how the potential for such regressors complicates the task
of assessing return predictors, and they explain how the underlying mechanism relates to
the spurious regression problem analyzed by Yule (1926) and Granger and Newbold (1974).
Ferson et al. also explain how data mining interacts with the problem of spurious regressors.
When the potential for spurious regressors exists (i.e., a persistent time-varying expected
return), data mining produces an especially greater chance of finding a series that appears
to predict returns but does so only spuriously.
The stronger is the prior motivation for entertaining a series as a return predictor, the
weaker is the concern that its apparent predictive ability is spurious.1 One quantity with
strong prior motivation as a return predictor is market-wide investor sentiment. At least as
early as Keynes (1936), numerous authors have considered the possibility that a significant
presence of sentiment-driven investors can cause prices to depart from fundamental values,
thereby creating a component of future returns that corrects such mispricing. Baker and
Wurgler (2006) and Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012), among others, find that investor
sentiment and/or consumer confidence exhibits an ability to predict returns on various classes
of stocks and investment strategies.2 These studies also refine the prior motivation of investor
sentiment as a predictor. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that sentiment
should play a stronger role among stocks that are more difficult to value. In support of that
hypothesis, they find sentiment exhibits greater ability to predict returns on small stocks,
young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme
growth stocks, and distressed stocks. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) hypothesize that
when market-wide sentiment is combined with Miller’s (1977) argument about the effects of
short-sale impediments, overpricing due to high sentiment is more likely than underpricing
1A regressor with prior motivation also often violates the spurious-regressor setting in Ferson, Sarkissian,
and Simin (2003), wherein the regressor bears no relation to return. Instead, the innovation in the regressor
is often correlated with contemporaneous return, whether or not the regressor predicts future return. Such
a correlation is especially likely for a regressor that is a valuation ratio, such as dividend yield. The finite-
sample bias that arises in such a setting is analyzed by Stambaugh (1999).
2Other studies that document the ability of sentiment measures to predict returns include Brown and
Cliff (2004, 2005), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), Baker and Wurgler (2007, 2012), Livnat and Petrovic
(2008), Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012), Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2013), Stambaugh, Yu,
and Yuan (2013), and Yu (2013).
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due to low sentiment. Their results support that argument, in that sentiment predicts profits
on the short legs of a large set of anomaly-based long-short strategies, whereas sentiment
exhibits no ability to predict long-leg profits.
Despite the prior motivation for the properties that investor sentiment exhibits empiri-
cally as a predictor of anomaly returns, one might nevertheless be concerned that sentiment
is simply a spurious predictor. Such a concern might be prompted, for example, by the
results of Novy-Marx (2013b), who reports that returns on various subsets of anomalies can
apparently be predicted by seemingly unlikely variables such as sunspots and planetary posi-
tions.3 This study assesses the odds that investor sentiment’s observed ability as a predictor
can be achieved by a spurious regressor. We focus on the role of consistency across multiple
return series and hypotheses. To understand the value of consistency, suppose the true ex-
pected returns across a number of portfolios possess some independent variation, but each
expected return’s true correlation with investor sentiment has the same sign. The greater
the number of portfolios, the more difficult it becomes to find a spurious regressor that will
exhibit finite-sample predictive ability consistently across portfolios comparable to that of in-
vestor sentiment. Our setting for exploring the role of consistency is that of Stambaugh, Yu,
and Yuan (2012). That study examines 11 different anomalies and finds consistent results
across those anomalies in support of three hypotheses: (i) a positive relation between cur-
rent sentiment and future long-short return spreads, (ii) a negative relation between current
sentiment and future short-leg returns, and (iii) no relation between current sentiment and
future long-leg returns. We simply ask how likely it is that such hypotheses are supported
as strongly by a randomly generated spurious regressor used in place of investor sentiment.
Out of 200 million simulated regressors, we find none that jointly support the three
hypotheses in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) as strongly as investor sentiment. The odds
are still quite long if one looks at just one of the three hypotheses. For example, comparably
strong and consistent support for the first hypothesis—a positive relation between sentiment
and the long-short return spread—occurs once in every 28,500 simulated regressors. For the
second hypothesis—a negative relation between sentiment and short-leg returns—comparable
support occurs once in every 105,000 regressors. If one sets aside any consideration of
strength (t-statistics) and simply looks at the signs of regression coefficients dictated by
the first two hypotheses, even then only one in every 43 simulated regressors achieves the
consistency exhibited with investor sentiment.
3Indeed, a preliminary version of that study presented such results in the context of spurious regressors.
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2. Empirical setting and simulation results
The empirical setting we analyze here focuses on the main set of regression results reported
by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), hereafter SYY. That study estimates the regression,
Ri,t = a+ bSt−1 + cMKTt + dSMBt + eHMLt + ut, (1)
where Ri,t is the excess return in month t on an anomaly strategy’s long leg, short leg, or
the difference, St−1 is the level of the investor-sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006)
at the end of month t−1, and MKTt, SMBt, and HMLt are the returns on month t on the
three stock-market factors defined by Fama and French (1993). SYY examine 11 anomalies
documented previously in the literature:
1. Failure probability (Campbell,Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2007)
2. Distress (Ohlson, 1980)
3. Net stock issues (Ritter, 1991, and Loughran and Ritter, 1995)
4. Composite equity issues (Daniel and Titman, 2006)
5. Total accruals (Sloan, 1996)
6. Net operating assets (Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang, 2004)
7. Momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993)
8. Gross profitability (Novy-Marx, 2013a)
9. Asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill, 2008)
10. Return on assets (Fama and French, 2006, Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang, 2010, Wang
and Yu, 2010)
11. Investment-to-assets (Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2004, and Xing, 2008)
As in SYY, the sample period is from August 1965 through January 2008 for all but anomaly
(1), whose data begin in December 1974, and anomalies (2) and (10), whose data begin in
January 1972. For each anomaly, SYY examine the long-short strategy using deciles 1 and
10 of a sort based on the anomaly variable, with the long leg being the decile with the highest
average return. SYY also examine a combination strategy that takes equal positions across
the long-short strategies constructed in any given month.
The coefficient of interest in equation (1) is b. SYY (cf. table 5) report results of
estimating b for each of the 11 anomalies, as well as the combination strategy, in three
sets of regressions that relate to the three hypotheses explored in that study. For the first
hypothesis, Ri,t is the long-short return difference, and the estimate bˆ has the predicted
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positive sign for all 11 anomalies. The t-statistic for bˆ, based on the heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard error of White (1980), ranges from 0.22 to 3.38 across the individual
anomalies and equals 2.98 for the combination strategy. For the second hypothesis, Ri,t
is the short-leg return, and bˆ has the predicted negative sign for all 11 anomalies. The
t-statistic ranges from −1.11 to −3.58 across the individual anomalies and equals −3.01
for the combination strategy. The third hypothesis, in which Ri,t is the long-leg return,
predicts b should be roughly zero. In these regressions, the signs of bˆ are mixed across the
individual anomalies (7 positive, 4 negative), with t-statistics ranging from -2.07 to 1.44,
and the combination strategy has a t-statistic of 0.15. When viewed collectively across the
estimated 36 regressions (12 for each hypothesis), the SYY results appear to present fairly
strong support for all three hypotheses explored.
In this study, we ask how likely it is that a spurious predictor would support the three SYY
hypotheses as strongly as investor sentiment. We randomly generate a predictor series xt, use
it to replace St, and then re-estimate equation (1) for the same 36 regressions summarized
above. That procedure is repeated 200 million times. Each predictor series xt is generated
as a first-order autoregressive process with normal innovations and autocorrelation equal
to 0.988, which equals the sample autocorrelation of St adjusted for the first-order bias
correction in Marriott and Pope (1954) and Kendall (1954).
2.1. Joint comparisons of t-statistics
To judge whether xt supports a given hypothesis as strongly as St, we ask whether the t-
statistics for bˆ, viewed jointly across anomalies, are as favorable to the hypothesis as those
produced using St. To determine this condition in the case of the first hypothesis, for which
Ri,t is the long-short return difference, define t¯
S
i as the i-th highest t-statistic for bˆ among
the 11 anomalies when St is used. Similarly define t¯
x
i as the i-th highest t-statistic for bˆ
among the 11 anomalies when xt is used. Let t
S
C denote the t-statistic for the combination
strategy when St is used, and let t
x
C denote the corresponding t-statistic when xt is used.
Then xt supports the first hypothesis (b > 0) as strongly as St if t¯
x
i ≥ t¯
S
i for i = 1, . . . , 11
and txC ≥ t
S
C .
Only once in every 28,500 generated xt series, on average, is the first hypothesis supported
as strongly by xt as by St. This result is reported in the last row of the first column of Table
1. The other rows display the frequencies with which fewer of the above inequalities are
satisfied. For example, the first row of the same column reports that at least one of the 11
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values of t¯xi exceeds the corresponding value of t¯
S
i once in each 22 generated xt series. The
sharp increase in values as one moves down the column illustrates the dramatic effect of
requiring consistency across multiple anomalies. Just finding an xt for which more than half
of the t¯xi values exceed the corresponding t¯
S
i values happens only once in every 833 xt series.
The next-to-last row reports that, for just the combination strategy, the t-statistic obtained
with xt exceeds that obtained with St once in every 67 series.
The odds for a spurious regressor become even longer when considering the second hy-
pothesis, as we see from the second column of Table 1. That hypothesis is supported as
strongly by xt as it is by St only once in every 105,000 series. The inequality conditions
here are essentially just the reverse of those earlier, since Ri,t is now the short-leg return and
the prediction is instead that b < 0. Let tSi denote the i-th lowest t-statistic for bˆ when St
is used, and let txi denote the i-th lowest t-statistic when xt is used. Then xt supports the
second hypothesis as strongly as St if t
x
i ≤ t
S
i for i = 1, . . . , 11 and t
x
C ≤ t
S
C. As with the first
hypothesis, the effects of requiring consistency across the separate regressions are dramatic.
Even for just the single regression with the combination strategy, however, obtaining a neg-
ative t-statistic greater in magnitude than that obtained with St occurs only once in every
169 series.
The third hypothesis is that b = 0. In order for that hypothesis to be supported at least
as strongly by a randomly generated xt as it is by St, we require xt−1 to be as consistently
weak as St−1 in its ability to predict Ri,t, now defined as the long-leg return. For this case,
let |t|Si denote the i-th smallest t-statistic in absolute value when St is used, and let |t|
x
i
denote the i-th smallest t-statistic in absolute value when xt is used. Then xt supports the
third hypothesis as strongly as St if |t|
x
i ≤ |t|
S
i for i = 1, . . . , 11 and |t
x
C| ≤ |t
S
C|.
While the odds for a spurious regressor improve when considering just the third hy-
pothesis, they are still rather long. Again we see the effect of consistency when requiring
the absence of an apparent relation with the regressor. Only once in every 919 randomly
generated xt series do we find one that is as consistently unsuccessful in predicting long-leg
returns.
Of course, the story does not end with simply considering each of the three hypotheses
in isolation. As SYY explain, these hypotheses arise as a set of joint implications, developed
by combining the presence of market-wide swings in sentiment with the argument in Miller
(1977) that short-sale impediments allow overpricing to be more prevalent than underpricing.
The final two columns report the frequencies with which a spurious regressor xt supports
more than one hypothesis as strongly as St, where comparable support of each individual
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hypothesis is judged as before. Only one spurious regressor out of 468,000 supports the first
two hypotheses as strongly as investor sentiment. When we look for a spurious regressor that
supports all three hypotheses as strongly as investor sentiment, we actually find none among
200 million simulated series. When confining the exercise to just the single regressions using
the combination strategy, we still find that only one spurious regressor out of every 6,580
simultaneously supports each of the three hypotheses as strongly as investor sentiment.
2.2. Joint-comparison benchmarks
As the above analysis illustrates, the consistency of results across multiple anomalies and
hypotheses makes it especially unlikely that such results are produced by a spurious regressor.
While simultaneous joint comparisons reveal the importance of consistency, they can also
make interpreting the strength of the results less straightforward. Each number in Table 1
essentially gives the reciprocal of the probability under the “null hypothesis”—a spurious
predictor—of obtaining a sample outcome at least as extreme as the one actually observed
using the sentiment series St. However, when the comparison involves a vector of statistics,
as opposed to a single statistic, the corresponding probability can be fairly low even if the
sample outcome is considerably less extreme than the sample outcome that was actually
observed. If considerably less extreme outcomes also have low probabilities under the null,
then it becomes difficult to interpret the low probability associated with outcomes more
extreme than the actual outcome.4
Interpreting the values in Table 1 becomes easier in the presence of benchmark values
that reflect what one expects the values in Table 1 to be when the actual sentiment series St is
replaced by a truly spurious predictor. Table 2 contains such benchmark values, computed by
replacing the t-statistics based on the sentiment series St with t-statistics based on a spurious
regressor yt. That is, rather than tabulating how often a spurious regressor xt supports the
SYY hypothesis as well as the actual series St, we tabulate how often a spurious regressor
xt does as well as another spurious regressor yt. A new series yt is drawn for each draw of
the series xt.
Consider, for example, the frequency with which a spurious regressor xt jointly supports
the three SYY hypotheses across all anomalies as strongly as the actual regressor St. Recall
from Table 1 that we find this frequency to be less than one in 200 million. When St is
replaced by a truly spurious regressor yt, we see from the bottom-right entry in Table 2 that
4We are grateful to the referee for raising this issue.
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one spurious regressor xt out of about 71 supports the three SYY hypotheses as strongly
as yt. In other words, the Table 2 value of 71 is a benchmark for interpreting the Table 1
value of 200 million: it is what one expects the Table 1 value to be if St is truly spurious.
Dividing the Table 1 value by the Table 2 value gives what might be characterized as the
“effective” value of the former. For example, dividing 200 million by 71 gives an effective
value of about 2.8 million—still very large. Similar comparisons to Table 2 can be made for
other values in Table 1. For example, recall from Table 1 that only one spurious regressor
out of 468,000 supports the first two SYY hypotheses as strongly as St. The corresponding
benchmark value in Table 2 is 4.4, and dividing 468,000 by 4.4 still gives over 106,000. In
general we see that, while the joint-comparison issue is important, interpreting the Table 1
values in light of the Table 2 benchmarks still yields the overall conclusion that the SYY
results are extremely unlikely if St is a spurious regressor.
2.3. Additional comparisons
To judge whether a spurious regressor supports the SYY hypotheses as strongly as the
actual investor sentiment series, one must define “supports as strongly.” While the definition
employed above in Tables 1 and 2 seems a reasonable way to capture the consistency of results
across anomalies, there are of course alternative definitions. For example, we could instead
examine the k least favorable t-statistics for a given hypothesis, comparing those produced
by xt to those obtained using St. To illustrate, let k = 1 and consider the first hypothesis,
which predicts b > 0 when Ri,t is the long-short return difference. The lowest t-statistic
produced by St among the 11 anomalies is equal to 0.22, and less than one xt series out of
every 50 produces a minimum t-statistic greater than that value. For the second hypothesis,
which predicts b < 0 when Ri,t is the short-leg return, the weakest t-statistic using St is
-1.11, and only one xt in every 2,300 produces a weakest statistic less than -1.11. Now let
k = 2, and note that the second-lowest t-statistic produced by St for the first hypothesis
equals 0.76. Only one xt series out of every 163 produces a lowest t-statistic greater than
0.22 as well as a second-lowest t-statistic greater than 0.76. With hypothesis 2, for only one
xt out of 10,000 are the two weakest t-statistics more favorable to the hypothesis than the
two weakest t-statistics using St. Proceeding through additional k values and the remaining
third hypothesis would produce a table in the same format as Table 1, with entries in the final
three rows identical to those in Table 1 and larger entries in the first ten rows, corresponding
to longer odds.5 Thus, comparing the weakest results across the individual anomalies would
5To see this, note that the k-th row of Table 1 reports the frequency with which any k of the ordered
t-statistics using xt is as favorable to the given hypothesis as are the corresponding ordered t-statistics using
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deliver a similar message as Table 1, if anything even more strongly.
Of course, conducting joint comparisons of weakest results raises the same benchmarking
issue discussed in the previous subsection. That is, an alternative version of Table 1 based
on comparing weakest results could be accompanied by the corresponding weakest-result
version of Table 2. For example, when k = 1, the alternative Table 1 values of 50 and 2,300
reported above for the first and second hypotheses have corresponding “effective” values of
25 and 1,150 when divided by the values that would appear in the alternative version of
Table 2. Similarly, when k = 2, the alternative Table 1 values of 163 and 10,000 reported
above have corresponding effective values of 70 and 4,367. As before, the low frequencies
still seem low when interpreted in the context of joint comparisons.
Another approach that to some degree captures consistency across anomalies is simply
comparing median t-statistics. For example, across the 11 individual anomalies as well as the
combination strategy, the median t-statistic for the first hypothesis equals 2.41 using St, and
one xt out of every 1,650 produces a median t-statistic as large. For the second hypothesis,
the median t-statistic using St equals -2.57, and one xt out of every 1,186 produces a median
t-statistic greater in negative magnitude. Only one xt out of every 7,103 produces median t-
statistics that are simultaneously as favorable to both hypotheses. For the third hypothesis,
the median absolute t-statistic using St is 0.46. One xt out of every 15 produces a median
absolute t-statistic that low, but only one xt out of 562,000 does so while simultaneously
producing median statistics as favorable to the first two hypotheses as those obtained using
St. The effective frequency of such an outcome is still less than one out of 123,000 if one
adjusts for the joint-comparison issue in the same manner as discussed earlier.
The average t-statistic across anomalies says little about consistency across anomalies.
Nevertheless, it appears rather unlikely that a spurious regressor can produce even compara-
bly favorable average t-statistics. For example, the averages of the SYY-reported t-statistics
across the 11 anomalies and the combination strategy are 2.14 and -2.38 for the first and
second hypotheses, respectively. The average absolute value of the SYY-reported t-statistics
is 0.69 for the third hypothesis. An average t-statistic supporting the first hypothesis as
strongly (i.e., greater than 2.14) is produced by one xt out of every 554. An average t-
statistic supporting the second hypothesis as strongly (i.e., less than -2.38) occurs for one
xt out of every 1,393. Average t-statistics simultaneously supporting both hypotheses as
strongly occur once every 2,412. An xt producing that simultaneous support for the first
St. The k-th row of the alternative table would consider instead the least favorable k t-statistics, constituting
only a subset of the outcomes included in the frequency in Table 1.
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two hypotheses while also being as favorable to the third hypothesis—delivering an average
absolute t-statistic less than 0.69—occurs only once in every 237,000. Adjusting for the joint
comparison issue still leaves that effective frequency at less than one in every 53,000.
Finally, fairly unlikely is just the possibility that a spurious regressor would give bˆ’s with
the predicted signs consistently across all anomalies. Table 3 reports the frequencies with
which a spurious regressor gives the predicted sign across anomalies for the long-short differ-
ence (first hypothesis) and the short-leg return (second hypothesis). For the first hypothesis,
one in every 25 spurious regressors gives the predicted positive sign for all 11 anomalies.
For the second hypothesis, the frequency of getting the predicted negative sign for all 11
anomalies is one in every 21. A spurious predictor that produces all 22 coefficients with the
predicted signs, as does investor sentiment, occurs only once in every 43 randomly generated
regressors.
3. Conclusions
It appears to be extremely unlikely that the observed role of investor sentiment in stock-
return anomalies can be filled by a spurious regressor. Out of 200 million simulated re-
gressors, we find none. These very long odds—seemingly no better than those attached to
winning the Powerball Jackpot with a single play—reflect the consistency with which in-
vestor sentiment produces results across multiple anomalies for the three SYY hypotheses.6
Simultaneous support of the SYY hypotheses is important, by itself, in that the odds of a
spurious regressor supporting them as strongly as investor sentiment are only 1 in 6,580 even
when all of the anomalies are combined into a single long-short strategy. It is the consis-
tency across the individual anomalies, however, that raises the highest hurdle for a spurious
regressor to clear in order to play the role of investor sentiment.
6Powerball is a multi-state lottery in which the odds of a single combination of numbers claiming a share
of the top “Jackpot” prize are roughly 1 in 175 million.
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Table 1
Number of Randomly Generated Predictors Required to Obtain One Predictor
That Produces Results as Strong as Investor Sentiment
The table reports the reciprocal of the frequency with which a randomly generated predictor xt produces
results as strong as investor sentiment St when xt replaces St in the regression,
Ri,t = a+ bSt−1 + cMKTt + dSMBt + eHMLt + ut,
where Ri,t is the excess return in month t on an anomaly’s long leg, short leg, or the difference, St is the
level of the investor-sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006), and MKTt, SMBt and HMLt are the
three stock-market factors defined in Fama and French (1993). The predictor xt is generated as a first-order
autoregression with autocorrelation equal to 0.988, the bias-corrected estimate of the autocorrelation of St.
Let t¯Si denote the i-th highest t-statistic for bˆ (the estimate of b) among the 11 anomalies when St is used,
and let t¯xi denote the i-th highest t-statistic when xt is used. Let t
S
i denote the i-th lowest t-statistic for bˆ
when St is used, and let t
x
i denote the i-th lowest t-statistic when xt is used. Let |t|
S
i denote the i-th smallest
t-statistic in absolute value when St is used, and let |t|
x
i denote the i-th smallest t-statistic in absolute value
when xt is used. The row for j anomalies reflects the frequency with which the following conditions are
satisfied:
t¯xi ≥ t¯
S
i occurred at least j times among i = 1, . . . , 11, in the long-short column.
txi ≤ t
S
i occurred at least j times among i = 1, . . . , 11, in the short-leg column.
|t|xi ≤ |t|
S
i occurred at least j times among i = 1, . . . , 11, in the long-leg column.
The “combination” row reflects the frequencies with which a simulated predictor produces t-statistics sat-
isfying the above inequalities when Ri,t is an equally weighted combination of the 11 anomaly strategies.
The final row reflects the frequencies with which the above inequalities are satisfied for 11 anomalies as well
as the combination strategy. The last two columns reflect the frequencies with which the inequalities are
satisfied jointly across the previous columns.
(1) (2) (3)
Comparisons Long–Short Short Leg Long Leg (1) and (2) (1), (2), and (3)
1 anomaly 22 39 1.2 – –
2 anomalies 57 77 1.5 – –
3 anomalies 124 146 1.9 – –
4 anomalies 251 288 2.6 – –
5 anomalies 469 616 3.7 – –
6 anomalies 833 1,310 5.4 – –
7 anomalies 1,460 2,950 8.5 – –
8 anomalies 2,570 5,700 14 – –
9 anomalies 4,740 11,400 25 – –
10 anomalies 10,000 28,400 51 – –
11 anomalies 28,500 105,000 143 – –
Combination 67 169 13 221 6,580
11 plus the combination 28,500 105,000 919 468,000 > 200,000,000a
aThere were zero cases obtained among the 200,000,000 predictors randomly generated.
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Table 2
Benchmark Number of Randomly Generated Predictors Required to Obtain One
Predictor That Produces Results as Strong as Another Random Predictor
The table reports the reciprocal of the frequency with which a randomly generated predictor xt produces
results as strong as another randomly generated predictor yt when xt and yt replace St in the regression,
Ri,t = a+ bSt−1 + cMKTt + dSMBt + eHMLt + ut,
where Ri,t is the excess return in month t on an anomaly’s long leg, short leg, or the difference, St is the
level of the investor-sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006), and MKTt, SMBt and HMLt are
the three stock-market factors defined in Fama and French (1993). The predictor xt and yt are generated
as a first-order autoregression with autocorrelation equal to 0.988, the bias-corrected estimate of the
autocorrelation of St.
Let t¯yi denote the i-th highest t-statistic for bˆ (the estimate of b) among the 11 anomalies when yt is used,
and let t¯xi denote the i-th highest t-statistic when xt is used. Let t
y
i denote the i-th lowest t-statistic for bˆ
when yt is used, and let t
x
i denote the i-th lowest t-statistic when xt is used. Let |t|
y
i denote the i-th smallest
t-statistic in absolute value when yt is used, and let |t|
x
i denote the i-th smallest t-statistic in absolute value
when xt is used. The row for j anomalies reflects the frequency with which the following conditions are
satisfied:
t¯xi ≥ t¯
y
i occurred at least j times among i = 1, . . . , 11, in the long-short column.
txi ≤ t
y
i occurred at least j times among i = 1, . . . , 11, in the short-leg column.
|t|xi ≤ |t|
y
i occurred at least j times among i = 1, . . . , 11, in the long-leg column.
The “combination” row reflects the frequencies with which a simulated predictor produces t-statistics sat-
isfying the above inequalities when Ri,t is an equally weighted combination of the 11 anomaly strategies.
The final row reflects the frequencies with which the above inequalities are satisfied for 11 anomalies as well
as the combination strategy. The last two columns reflect the frequencies with which the inequalities are
satisfied jointly across the previous columns.
(1) (2) (3)
Comparisons Long–Short Short Leg Long Leg (1) and (2) (1), (2), and (3)
1 anomaly 1.4 1.4 1.1 – –
2 anomalies 1.6 1.5 1.2 – –
3 anomalies 1.7 1.7 1.3 – –
4 anomalies 1.8 1.8 1.5 – –
5 anomalies 1.9 1.9 1.7 – –
6 anomalies 2.0 2.0 2.0 – –
7 anomalies 2.1 2.1 2.4 – –
8 anomalies 2.3 2.3 3.0 – –
9 anomalies 2.5 2.5 3.9 – –
10 anomalies 2.8 2.8 5.8 – –
11 anomalies 3.5 3.5 11.5 – –
Combination 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 4.4
11 plus the combination 3.5 3.5 16.3 4.4 70.8
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Table 3
Number of Randomly Generated Predictors Required to Obtain One Predictor
That Enters with the Correct Sign
The table reports the reciprocal of the frequency with which a randomly generated predictor xt
produces an estimate of b with the predicted sign when xt replaces St in the regression,
Ri,t = a + bSt−1 + cMKTt + dSMBt + eHMLt + ut,
where Ri,t is the excess return in month t on an anomaly’s long leg, short leg, or the difference, St
is the level of the investor-sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006), and MKTt, SMBt and
HMLt are the three stock-market factors defined in Fama and French (1993). The predictor xt
is generated as a first-order autoregression with autocorrelation equal to 0.988, the bias-corrected
estimate of the autocorrelation of St.
The row for j anomalies reflects the frequency with which a simulated predictor produces an esti-
mate of b for at least j anomalies with the predicted sign (positive in the long-short column and
negative in the short-leg column). The “combination” row reflects the frequency with which a sim-
ulated predictor produces an estimate of b with the predicted sign when Ri,t is an equally weighted
combination of the 11 anomaly strategies. The last column reflects the frequencies with which the
predicted signs are obtained jointly across the previous columns.
(1) (2)
Comparisons Long–Short Short Leg (1) and (2)
1 anomaly 1.0 1.1 –
2 anomalies 1.1 1.1 –
3 anomalies 1.3 1.3 –
4 anomalies 1.4 1.4 –
5 anomalies 1.7 1.7 –
6 anomalies 2.0 2.0 –
7 anomalies 2.5 2.5 –
8 anomalies 3.3 3.3 –
9 anomalies 4.9 4.9 –
10 anomalies 8.8 8.5 –
11 anomalies 25 21 –
Combination 2.0 2.0 2.2
11 plus the combination 25 21 43
12
References
Antoniou, C., Doukas, J., Subrahmanyam, A., 2013, Cognitive dissonance, sentiment, and momen-
tum. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, 245–275.
Baker, M., Wurgler, J., 2006. Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns. Journal of
Finance 61, 1645–1680.
Baker, M., Wurgler, J., 2007. Investor sentiment in the stock market. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 21, 129–152.
Baker, M., Wurgler, J., 2012. Comovement and predictability relationships between bonds and the
cross-section of stocks. Review of Asset Pricing Studies 2, 57–87.
Baker, M., Wurgler, J., Yuan Y., 2012, Global, Local, and Contagious Investor Sentiment, Journal
of Financial Economics 104, 272–287.
Brown, G., Cliff, M., 2004, Investor sentiment and the near-term stock market, Journal of Empirical
Finance 11, 1–27.
Brown, G., Cliff, M., 2005, Investor sentiment and asset valuation, Journal of Business 78, 405–440.
Campbell, J. Y., Hilscher, J., Szilagyi, J., 2008. In search of distress risk. Journal of Finance 63,
2899–2939.
Cooper, M. J., Gulen, H., Schill, M. J., 2008. Asset growth and the cross-section of stock returns.
Journal of Finance 63, 1609–1652.
Daniel, K. D., Titman, S., 2006. Market reactions to tangible and intangible information. Journal
of Finance 61, 1605–1643.
Fama, E., French, K., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of
Financial Economics 33, 3–56.
Fama, E., French, K., 2006. Profitability, investment, and average returns. Journal of Financial
Economics 82, 491–518.
Ferson, W., Sarkissian, S., Simin, T.T., 2003. Spurious regressions in financial economics? Journal
of Finance 58, 1393–1413.
Granger, C. W.J., Newbold,P., 1974. Spurious regressions in economics. Journal of Econometrics
4, 111–120.
Hirshleifer, D., Hou, K., Teoh, S. H., Zhang, Y., 2004. Do investors overvalue firms with bloated
balance sheets. Journal of Accounting and Economics 38, 297–331.
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 1993. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: implications for
market efficiency. Journal of Finance 48, 65–91.
Kendall, M.G., 1954. Note on bias in the estimation of autocorrelation. Biometrika 41, 403–404.
Keynes, J. M., 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Macmillan,
London.
13
Lemmon M., Portniaquina, E., 2006. Consumer confidence and asset prices: some empirical evi-
dence. Review of Financial Studies 19, 1499– 1529.
Livnat, J., Petrovits, C., 2009. Investor sentiment, post-earnings announcement drift, and accruals,
Unpublished working paper, New York University.
Loughran, T., Ritter, J. R., 1995. The new issues puzzle. Journal of Finance 50, 23–51.
Marriott, F.H.C., Pope, J.A., 1954. Bias in the estimation of autocorrelations. Biometrika 41,
390–402.
Miller, E. M., 1977. Risk, uncertainty and divergence of opinion. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168.
Novy-Marx, R., 2013a. The other side of value: The gross profitability premium. Journal of
Financial Economics 108, 1–28.
Novy-Marx, R., 2013b. Predicting Anomaly Performance with Politics, the Weather, Global Warm-
ing, Sunspots, and the Stars. Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming.
Ohlson, J. A., 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of
Accounting Research 18, 109–131.
Ritter, J. R., 1991. The long-run performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 46,
3–27.
Sloan, R.G., 1996. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future
earnings? Accounting Review 71, 289–315.
Stambaugh, R.F., 1999. Predictive regressions. Journal of Financial Economics 54, 375–421.
Stambaugh, R.F., Yu, J., Yuan, Y., 2012. The short of it: Investor sentiment and anomalies.
Journal of Financial Economics 104, 288–302.
Stambaugh, R.F., Yu, J., Yuan, Y., 2013. Arbitrage asymmetry and the idiosyncratic volatility
puzzle. Unpublished working paper. University of Pennsylvania.
Titman, S., Wei, K., Xie, F., 2004. Capital investments and stock returns. Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis 39, 677–700.
Wang, H., Yu, J., 2010. Dissecting the profitability premium. Unpublished working paper. Uni-
versity of Minnesota.
Xing, Y., 2008. Interpreting the value effect through the Q-theory: an empirical investigation.
Review of Financial Studies 21, 1767–1795.
Yu, J., 2013. A sentiment-based explanation of the forward premium puzzle. Journal of Monetary
Economics 60, 474–491.
Yule, G. U., 1926. Why do we sometimes get nonsense correlations between time series? A study
in sampling and the nature of time series. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 89, 1–64.
14
